DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s40565-019-0500-2 |
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Deducing cascading failures caused by cyberattacks based on attack gains and cost principle in cyber-physical power systems |
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Net amount: 605 |
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Author:
Yufei WANG1,2, Yanli LIU3, Jun’e LI1
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Author Affiliation:
1 Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China 2 Global Energy Interconnection Research Institute Co. Ltd, Beijing 102209, China 3 Key Laboratory of Smart Grid of Ministry of Education, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
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Foundation: |
This work was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No.2017YFB0903000), National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61471328), and Natural Science Foundation of Tianjin City (No. 15JCQNJC07000). |
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Abstract: |
To warn the cascading failures caused by cyberattacks (CFCAs) in real time and reduce their damage on cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs), a novel early warning method based on attack gains and cost principle (AGCP) is proposed. Firstly, according to the CFCA characteristics, the leading role of attackers in the whole evolutionary process is discussed. The breaking out of a CFCA is deduced based on the AGCP from the view of attackers, and the priority order of all CFCAs is then provided. Then, the method to calculate the probability of CFCAs is proposed, and an early warning model for CFCA is designed. Finally, to verify the effectiveness of this method, a variety of CFCAs are simulated in a local CPPS model based on the IEEE 39-bus system. The experimental results demonstrate that this method can be used as a reliable assistant analysis technology to facilitate early warning of CFCAs. |
Keywords: |
Cyber-physical power system, Cascading failure, Cyberattack, Early warning, Fault probability, Attack gains and cost principle, Attack route choice |
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Online Time:2019/11/27 |
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